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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Respondent, Utah State Tax Commission, respectfully 
petitions the Utah Court of Appeals for rehearing with respect to 
the Court's decision in the above captioned matter dated February 
19, 1993. 
BACKGROUND 
Alpine school district volunteered to have this case be 
one of five "test cases" selected from approximately 35 to 40 
cases currently pending before the Tax Commission involving this 
issue. Three cases were appealed and briefs filed with the Utah 
Supreme Court. This case was poured over to the Court of Appeals 
which issued its decision on February 19, 1993 reversing the 
Order of the Tax Commission. The other two cases were argued 
January 13, 1993 and February 1, 1993 before the Supreme Court 
which has them under advisement. Resolution of the issues 
presented in these cases was intended by all parties to impact 
not only the named Petitioners but those cases currently pending 
before the Tax Commission. 
ISSUE ON REHEARING 
Did the Court misapprehend the law or overturn findings 
of fact which, when viewed under the proper standards of review, 
would require the Court to reverse or modify its opinion. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court applied the "correction of error" standard 
when the Commission's application of law to the facts should have 
been reviewed for "reasonableness." The Court misapprehended 
important sales tax laws which directly impact its decision. The 
Court overlooked key findings of fact by the Commission and 
overturned other findings without requiring Petitioners to 
marshall the* evidence in support of the findings and without 
holding that the Commission's factual findings were not supported 
by substantial evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IS "REASONABLENESS." 
Although the case cited by this Court, Morton 
International Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1992), restates the Pre-A.P.A. Standard of Review, the case which 
articulated that standard is Utah Department of Administrative 
Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, (Utah 1983). 
As set forth in that case Mmixed questions of law or fact or the 
application of findings of basic fact to the legal rules 
governing the case are reviewed for reasonableness." Id. at 610. 
In applying the law to the facts in this case, the Commission, in 
its conclusions of law paragraph 14 states: 
It is not merely whether the exempt entity engages in 
the m€*chanics of a purchase, but rather the legal 
status of the exempt entity at the time the purchase is 
made, i.e., is it purchasing the property as the final 
consumer of the tangible personal property. If the 
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exempt entity makes the purchase for itself and its own 
use, consumption, or conversion to real property, the 
purchase is exempt from sales and use tax. On the 
other hand, if the exempt entity makes the purchase for 
another person or entity, or for use, consumption, or 
conversion to real property by another person or 
entity, the purchase is not exempt from sales and use 
tax because the exempt entity has only acted in the 
capacity of a purchasing agent for the final consumer 
which is the contractor. 
The Court must determine if this conclusion is 
reasonable in light of the statutory setting in which it 
operates. Id. at 611. In reviewing this finding, the Court 
erred in applying a correction of error standard which affords no 
deference to the Commission's application of the law to the facts 
of the case. Under the standard set forth in Utah Administrative 
Services, the Court should affirm the Commission's application of 
law to the facts unless it finds it "unreasonable." Id. at 658 
P.2d 607. 
II. THE COURTS DECISION MISAPPREHENDS THE LAW. 
A. The term sale includes transfer. 
In its opinion, the Court's statements indicate a 
misapprehension of the relevant law. It dismisses the 
Commission's substantial findings regarding the burdens and 
benefits of ownership of the property by stating: 
According to the case cited by the Tax Commission, the 
benefits and burdens test is used to determine when a 
transfer of property takes place for tax purposes. 
J.B.N. Tel. Co. Inc. v. Unites States, 638 F.2d 227, 
232 (10th Cir. 1981). Sales tax, however, is imposed 
on the sale not the transfer of property. 
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The statement that the sales tax is imposed on the 
"sale" not on the transfer of property, misapprehends basic tax 
principles. "Sale" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-
102(10)(e) means: 
any transaction under which the right to possession, 
operation, or use of any article of tangible personal 
property is granted under a lease or contract and the 
transfer of possession would be taxable if an outright 
sale were made. 
Therefore, the Commission's statement that a salens tax is 
"imposed on the sale and not on the transfer of property" is not 
an accurate statement of the law and should not be relied on to 
support the Court's reasoning in its decision. The decision also 
ignores the possibility of a taxable transfer occurring after the 
initial purchase. 
B. The Court misapprehended a critical area of the 
law regarding application of the use tax to the transaction. 
The statement that the "benefits and burdens" are 
looked at only to determine whether there has been a "transfer" 
fails to follow through with the analysis. Respondent cited 
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 S. Ct. 561 (1978) for a well 
recognized principle of taxation; as stated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court: 
This Court, almost 50 years ago, observed that 
"taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements 
of title as it is with actual command over the property 
taxed - the actual benefit for which the tax is paid." 
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(citations omitted). The Court in Frank Lyon went on to state 
that taxation was concerned with substance over form, with "the 
objective realities of the transaction rather than the particular 
form the parties employed." Id. at 573. 
Understanding of this principle is critical to analysis of 
Tax Commission's ruling. Central to the Commission's ruling was 
the finding that Petitioners had the burdens and benefits of 
ownership of the property. The "objective reality" of the 
transaction was that the party entitled to a tax exemption, 
Apline School District, contracted for, purchased and received 
from Petitioner a real property improvement, not tangible 
personal property. The Commission's finding that "to be exempt, 
the sale must be from the vendor directly to the governmental 
entity, religious institution or charitable organization for the 
use of and consumption by the exempt entity" is based on this 
principal of looking to the economic realities of the 
transaction. The form of the transaction should not be 
manipulated to avoid taxation. As stated by this Court in 
Superior Soft Water v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 
49 (Nov. 30, 1992) "the form and timing of the financing 
arrangement are irrelevant to the rational for exempting the sale 
of improvements to sales tax." Id. at 52. 
The Commission's decision is based on the long standing 
principal of imposing tax on real property contractors for 
materials used in constructing a real property improvement. See 
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Utah Concrete Products Corp, v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 
513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942). The Commission's decision applies well 
established law to the facts as found by the Commission. Unless 
the Court finds the Commission's actions unreasonable, they 
should be upheld. 
C. The opinion does not directly address the 
Commission's stated basis for imposing the tax. 
Finally, the Court misapprehended the legal basis of 
the Commission's imposition of the tax. The Commission's 
decision states "Petitioner was the real property contractor for 
those materials and pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was liable for 
the use tax on those materials." (Decision & Order page 24). 
The stated basis of the Commission's holding, use tax 
liability, is addressed only in a footnote where the Court 
states: 
We note that the governing Use Tax Act levies and 
imposes an excise tax on "[t]he storage, use, or other 
consumption in this state of tangible personal property 
purchased for storage, use or other consumption in this 
state." Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985) 
(Emphasis added). Again, because the use tax is based 
on the purchase of tangible personal property and Brown 
was not the purchaser, it cannot be liable for a use 
tax based on the purchase. 
Slip Opinion, p.5 n.2. The tax is clearly imposed on 
the "storage use or consumption of the property purchased for 
storage, use or consumption in the state." It is undisputed that 
all of the items assessed in the audit were "purchased for 
storage, use or consumption in the state." Therefore, the items 
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are subject to tax unless they qualify for a specific exemption. 
Under the use tax provision §59-16-3(a), the taxable transaction 
is not the purchase but the "storage, use or consumption." 
Therefore, the person liable for tax is the person "storing," 
"using," or "consuming" the property. Any exemption must apply 
to the storage, use or consumption,1 The Commission made 
specific factual findings to support its holding that Petitioner 
was the party "storing," "using" and "consuming" the property: 
Storage of any materials or equipment furnished by the 
owner was the responsibility of the contractor. 
(Finding of Fact 1. Decision & Order . . . page 3). 
A preponderance of the evidence indicates that 
Petitioner converted the materials from tangible 
personal property to real property. (Decision and 
Order page 23) . 
The person who converts tangible personal property to 
real property is the consumer of that tangible personal property 
and is liable for the tax. Utah Concrete Products, 101 Utah 513, 
525 P.2d 408 (1942). The Court's finding that Brown was "not the 
purchaser" and "cannot be liable for a use tax based on the 
purchase" misapprehends the basis of use tax liability and fails 
to address specific factual findings of the Commission. 
1
 Any of the above trigger liability. The statute is written 
in the disjunctive, therefore, it is not necessary to find all 
three. 
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III. THE COURT OVERTURNED FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION. 
Th€5 standard for overturning factual findings of the 
Commission is set forth in Utah Administrative Services as 
follows: 
The standard of review that affirms Commission findings 
on questions of basic fact if they are supported by 
"evidence of any substance whatever" and sets them 
aside only if they are "without foundation in fact" is 
the standard this Court will follow in reviewing the 
Commission's finding of basic facts in this case. 
658 P.2d at 609, In order to challenge the 
Commission's finding of fact, Petitioner is required to marshall 
the evidence in support of the findings and show that they are 
without foundation in fact. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); West Valley City v. Majestic Investment 
Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Cornish Town v. Roller, 
758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988). At page 2 of the Opinion, the Court 
states: 
Alpine amended the subcontract through change order 
provision deleting those direct-purchase materials from 
the subcontract. This, in effect, changed the 
subcontract from a furnish and install contract to an 
installation only contract with respect to the 
materials directly purchased by Alpine. 
Although Petitioner makes this unsupported assertion in its brief 
(Petitioner's brief page 4), it is directly contrary to the 
Commission's findings of fact paragraphs 25 and 28: 
25. The change orders which were executed did not 
relieve the Petitioner of its duty to furnish 
materials, so the contract remained a furnish and 
install contract. 
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28. Even after the change orders had been made, the 
contract still required the Petitioner to be 
responsible for "furnishing all the materials and labor 
required for the job as described. ..." 
The specific findings of fact by the Commission are in 
direct contravention of the unsupported assertion made in 
Petitioner's brief which was adopted by the Court. Petitioner, 
in challenging the Commission's findings of fact on this issue, 
did not attempt to marshall the evidence in support of the 
Commission's finding. 
The Commission's finding was based upon detailed contract 
provisions set forth in the record below. As set forth in the 
Stipulation of Facts page 5 (R.209), the relevant contract 
provisions provide: 
These provisions for direct purchase by the Board of 
materials and equipment shall not relieve the 
Contractor of any of its duties or obligations under 
this contract or constitute a waiver of the Board's 
right to absolute fulfillment of all the terms hereof. 
The contract also provided that Petitioner was responsible for 
any risk of loss, damage, theft, vandalism or destruction of any 
of the materials after delivery to the site. (Article 8 
paragraph B of the Supplementary Conditions of Instructions to 
Bidders Record 208 through 210) The contractor was responsible 
for the storage of the materials, all bonds and insurance were to 
remain in full force, the contractor was responsible for the 
quality of all materials regardless of how they were acquired. 
Id. The Commission carefully considered all of the relevant 
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contract provisions in the context of the brief and arguments 
presented below. 
In order for the stated factual basis of the February 19th 
Opinion to stand, the Court must overturn specific factual 
findings made by the Commission. In order to attack those 
factual findings, Petitioner must marshall all the evidence which 
supports those findings and in light of all of the evidence 
supporting the findings, the Court must hold that there is no 
substantial evidence to support the findings made by the 
Commission. That process was not followed in this case. As a 
result, the factual basis for the Court's ruling is improper. 
The statement that the "record can only support a finding that 
Alpine not Brown was the purchaser of the commodities" fails to 
properly consider the Commission's factual findings. 
CONCLUSION 
Rather than adhere to the factual findings of the 
Commission, the Court has adopted unsupported factual assertions 
made in Petitioner's brief as the foundation for its decision. 
In order to overturn the Commission's factual findings, all the 
evidence supporting the Commission's findings must be marshalled, 
then, in light of that evidence, the Court must determine that 
the Commission's findings have no foundation in fact. The Court 
failed to follow this procedure in this case. The result is a 
faulty factual premise for the Court's decision. 
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Under the Pre-A.P.A. Standard of Review the Court is 
required to give some deference to the Commission's application 
of law to the facts. The Commission's application of the law to 
the facts found should be reviewed for "reasonableness." 
However, the Court has stated that it reviewed the Commission's 
decision under a correction of error standard. The Court has 
misapprehended several key principles of the law in analyzing the 
Commission's actions. This misapprehension has resulted in 
statements in the opinion which are not accurate statements of 
the law. 
The opinion does not directly address the basis on 
which the Tax Commission imposed liability on Petitioner. As 
written, the opinion can be distinguished as a case where the 
Court found the facts to be different than those found by the 
Commission, and therefore, based upon its own factual findings, 
the Court reached a different conclusion. The Court's current 
opinion does not give any guidance as to whether the result is 
based on fundamental disagreement with the Commission's lengthy 
legal analysis or fundamental disagreement as to what the 
underlying facts were. It is important not only for the litigants 
in this case, but for all of the parties who have stayed their 
proceedings before the Commission awaiting the outcome of this 
decision, that the Court address the fundamental legal 
conclusions reached by the Commission. For all of the reasons 
stated above, Petitioner urges the Court to grant rehearing on 
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this matter so that the resulting decision and opinion can stand 
as a clear and correct statement of law in this area. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ,Z-i day j^,•-,-,,./, / 1993. 
-CLARK L."'SNELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
d^ 
-12-
CERTIFICATION 
The undersigned certifies that the Petition for 
Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
DATED this j t day of f]l\, ,. ( 1993. 
i 
IK L. SNELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX 
A. Tax Commission's Decision and Order dated March 10, 1992 
B, Opinion of the Court dated February 19, 1993. 
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APPENDIX A 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
BROWN PLUMBING & HEATING CO. , ) 
Petitioner, ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
V. ) AND FINAL DECISION 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE ) Appeal No. 87-0435 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, : 
) 
Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on July 11, 1991. Paul F. Iwasaki, 
Presiding Officer and R. H. Hansen, Chairman, heard the matter 
for and on behalf of the Commission. Present and representing 
the Petitioner was Blake T. Ostler, Attorney at law, of Kirton, 
McConkie and Poelman. Present and representing the Respondent 
was Clark L. Snelson and Brian Tarbet, Assistant Utah Attorneys 
General. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales and use tax. 
2. The period in question is January 1, 1984 to 
December 31, 1985. 
3. On June 4, 1985, Alpine School District entered 
into a "General Contractors Agreement" pursuant to which 
Paulsen/Ellsworth Construction Company was to act as the 
general contractor for Alpine School District for the 
construction of Cedar Hollow Jr. High School., The agreement 
required the general contractor to furnish "all labor and 
material, tools, implements, and equipment, scaffolding, 
permits, fees, etc." to build the school in accordance with the 
plans and specifications. 
4. The agreement provided for direct purchases of 
construction materials by the school district by adherence to 
certain procedures as follows: 
a. The owner (Alpine School District) could 
purchase certain major items and quantities of materials for 
utilization in the project by writing purchase orders directly 
to the suppliers. 
b. The general contractor and its 
subcontractors, were required to make a list of materials and 
the cost for which such materials could be directly purchased. 
c. The owner would then provide purchase 
requisitions upon which the contractor would specifically state 
its needs and schedules for delivery dates. 
d. The purchase orders were then written by the 
owner from the requisitions. 
e. The purchase order amount plus the sales tax 
amount was deducted from the total contract amount. 
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f. Invoices received upon receipt of delivery of 
materials to the project site were sent to the owner for direct 
payment. 
g. The contractor was required to hold the owner 
harmless for any losses, claims, defects, discrepancy, delays 
in delivery or other problems relating to the materials except 
where the failure was attributable to negligent acts or 
omissions by the owner. 
h. All risk of loss or damages to materials 
resulting from theft, vandalism or any other cause after the 
delivery of the materials to the project site was assumed by 
the contractor. 
i. The contractor was required to negotiate and 
administer all direct purchases by the owner and to furnish to 
the owner a description, source of supply, trade discount 
information and other information necessary to enable the owner 
to purchase directly any materials and equipment. 
j. The agreement stated that title to all such 
materials and equipment purchased by the owner passed from the 
vendor directly to the owner upon delivery to the job site. 
k. After delivery, the risk of loss, damage, 
theft, vandalism, or destruction of or to any materials and 
equipment purchased directly by the owner were the 
responsibility of the contractor. 
1. Storage of any materials and equipment 
furnished by the owner was the responsibility of the contractor. 
-3-
m. The contractor was required to acknowledge 
receipt and approval of any materials or equipment purchased 
directly by the owner by signing the invoice for any materials 
or equipment. 
n. The owner was to make payment for any 
materials or equipment within a reasonable time after the 
receipt of the signed invoice from the contractor. 
o. The owner was not responsible for the loss of 
a prompt payment discount from the purchase price if the owner 
made payment within ten business days following the receipt of 
the signed invoice from the contractor by the owner. 
p. The contract price was reduced by the amount 
actually paid by the owner for materials and equipment and by 
the sales tax which would have been paid on those materials and 
equipment had they been supplied by the contractor. Similarly, 
the amount of any progress payment provided for was adjusted to 
reflect the direct purchase of any materials and equipment by 
the owner. 
q. The owner was not responsible for the loss of 
or reduction in any trade discounts available to the contractor 
as a result of any purchases made by the owner. 
r. All bonds and insurance were to remain in 
full force. There was no reduction in the amount of coverage or 
any deduction for premiums for bonds and insurance. 
s. The provisions for direct purchase by the 
owner of materials and equipment did not relieve the contractor 
of any of its duties or obligations under the contract or 
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Appeal No. 87-043. 
constitute a waiver of the owner's right to absolute 
fulfillment of all the terms of the agreement. 
t. The contractor was required to provide and 
pay for all materials and equipment not furnished by the owner 
and to provide and pay for labor, transportation, services, 
tools, machinery and all other items and services, necessary 
for the proper execution and completion of the work on the 
project. 
u. If the contractor put into the work any 
unsatisfactory material or workmanship, the contractor was 
required to remove all such materials from the project. 
6. Petitioner was the plumbing subcontractor after 
entering into an agreement with Paulsen/Ellsworth Construction 
Company and was required to furnish and install plumbing 
fixtures on the project, subject to provisions for change 
orders. 
7. The owner, reserved the right to award separate 
contracts to perform work with its own forces if it so desired. 
8. The General Conditions of the Contract for 
Construction also provided that the owner could amend the 
contract by change order and also subtract a contract sum from 
the total contract if it so desired. 
9. The General Conditions provided for the owner's 
right to stop the work in the event of default or defalcations 
by the contractor. 
10. The Supplementary Conditions of the Instructions 
to Bidders contained a statement that the title to all 
*~\f ^ W WA-fc, 4..W. ,», . 
materials purchased directly by the owner on its own purchase 
orders, passed from the vendor directly to the Alpine Board of 
Education upon delivery to the job site without any vesting in 
the contractor. 
11. On February 20, 1986, Paulsen/Ellsworth Company, 
as general contractor, entered into a subcontract agreement 
with Petitioner Brown Plumbing and Heating Company. 
12. Pursuant to the subcontract, the Petitioner was 
the prime plumbing contractor on the project. 
1.3. The contracting documents provided for change 
orders. 
14. Change orders were made to the subcontract for 
materials directly purchased by the Petitioner. 
15. Pursuant to contract documents, purchase orders 
were issued by the school district. 
16. No surplus materials from the project were 
retained by the Petitioner. All materials purchased by the 
owner and installed by the Petitioner became fixtures or a part 
of the junior high school building. 
17. One warranty was provided to the owner by PVI 
Industries, Inc., for work performed by the Petitioner in 
relation to a water heater. The Petitioner installed the water 
heater as a part of the project, and the warranty covered the 
installation and performance of the water heater. The warranty 
recognized the owner as the appropriate claimant for any 
defects which may occur with the water heater. There were no 
other warranties on materials installed in the project by the 
Petitioner. 
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18. Dr. Harold Jacklin was the school district's 
construction supervisor and representative for the project. 
Dr. Jacklin is and has been an employee of the Alpine 
School District since 1973, and has supervised and managed 
other construction related projects as the school district's 
construction supervisor. 
19. Dr. Jacklin completed an apprenticeship as a 
bricklayer, and is generally familiar with all phases and 
common methods of construction and of the interfacing 
relationship between architect, contractor, subcontractor and 
the school district. 
20. Dr. Jacklin is familiar with materials that are 
used in construction and with materials installed on the 
Project. 
21. Dr. Jacklin visited the project site in the 
company of the project architect at least weekly during the 
construction. He was ultimately responsible to authorize the 
issuance of purchase orders for construction materials on 
behalf of the school district. Mr. Sherm Wankier, the 
purchasing agent and an employee of the school district, was 
directly responsible to fill out purchase orders on behalf of 
the school district and to send them to suppliers of materials 
for the project. 
22. After delivery, the risk of loss, damage, theft, 
vandalism, or destruction of or to any such materials and 
equipment so purchased would lie with the contractor unless the 
damage resulted from the owner's negligence. 
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23. The materials on the project were covered by the 
owner's insurer, Educators Insurance Company, and State Risk 
Management. The owner provided insurance coverage for owner 
purchased materials after purchase and through construction of 
the building. 
24. If the owner decided to directly purchase 
materials through the above described procedure, invoices 
received upon delivery of materials to the project site were 
sent to the owner for direct payment to the vendor. 
25. The change orders which were executed did not 
relieve the Petitioner of its duty to furnish materials, so the 
contract remained a furnish and install contract. 
26. The owner did not actively participate in the 
receipt or inspection of the materials, either by or through 
Mr. Jacklin or any other representative. 
27. The Petitioner, and not the owner, was 
responsible for all claims, shortages and defects in the 
materials, including those materials purported to have been 
purchased by the owner. Petitioner also warranted that all 
materials, including those purported to have been purchased by 
the owner, were and would be free of defects for a period of at 
least one year after acceptance of the project: by the owner. 
28. Even after the change orders had been made, the 
contract still required the Petitioner to be responsible for 
"furnishing of all materials and labor required for the job as 
described, together with all minor items implied or required to 
finish 'the entire work . . . .M The contract also held 
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Petitioner responsible for the final result, and provided that 
"This contractor shall furnish and install all fixtures shown 
or specified hereinafter and make all parts complete and leave 
the entire system in perfect working order . . . . Any damaged 
or cracked fixtures shall be replaced at the contractors 
expense." 
29. The risks of ownership of the materials was never 
on the owner, but shifted directly from the vendor to the 
Petitioner. 
30. The Petitioner, not the owner, bore the burdens 
of risk. The contract provided, "The contractor shall, in all 
cases, hold the owner harmless for any losses, claims, defects, 
discrepancy, delays in delivery or other problems relating to 
such materials . . . . all risk of loss or damage to materials 
resulting from theft, vandalism or any other cause whatsoever, 
shall be assumed by the contractor. . .." 
31. The owner reserved the right to go on the job 
site "to protect the Board from defects and deficiencies in the 
work" or even to stop or reject the work, but none of those 
actions by the owner acted to relieve the Petitioner from full 
responsibility for not only the labor and installation, but 
also the materials, 
32. When the materials were ordered, the involvement 
of the owner was minimal. When the materials were received and 
paid for, the Petitioner was required to "acknowledge receipt 
and approval of any such materials or equipment directly 
purchased by the Board by signing the invoice for any such 
material or equipment." Also, Brown Plumbing & Heating was 
responsible to inspect and notify the owner of receipt, 
conformance and quality of materials. Thus, payment for the 
materials was made only after authorization from Petitioner. 
33. The Petitioner bore the responsibility and 
expense of problems with the materials purchased, such as when 
a boiler had a defective part and the Petitioner, not the 
owner, called the supplier and had the boiler repaired. 
34. The Petitioner, not the owner, had the burdens 
and benefits of ownership, and possessed control and ownership 
of the materials and property. 
35. Petitioner did not present any evidence that 
there had been any detrimental reliance upon Rule R865-19-42S. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Sales made to the state, its institutions, and 
its political subdivisions are exempt from sales and use 
taxes, (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(2).) 
2. Sales made to or by religious or charitable 
institutions in the conduct of their regular religious or 
charitable functions and activities are exempt from sales and 
use taxes. (Utah Code Ann. §59-12-104(8).) 
3. Sales of tangible personal property to real 
property contractors and repairmen of real property are subject 
to sales and use taxes. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
4. The person who converts personal property into 
real property is the consumer of the personal property since he 
or she is the last person to own it as personal property. (Rule 
R865-19-58S). Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax 
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Commission, 802 P.2d 408 (Utah 1942); Olson Construction 
Company v. State Tax Commission, 12 Utah 2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 
(Utah 1961); and Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990). 
5. The contractor or repairman is the consumer of 
tangible personal property used to improve, alter or repair 
real property. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
6. Sales of materials and supplies to contractors 
and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final 
consumers, even if the contract is performed for a religious 
institution, charitable organization, or governmental 
instrumentality. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
7. Sales of materials to religious institutions, 
charitable organizations, and governmental instrumentalities 
are exempt only if sold as tangible personal property and the 
direct or indirect seller does not install the material as an 
improvement to realty or use it to repair real property. (Rule 
R865-19-58S). 
8. The contractor must accrue and report tax on all 
merchandise bought tax-free and used in performing contracts to 
improve or repair real property. (Rule R865-19-58S). 
9. Rule R865-19-58S is the primary rule governing 
the sale of materials and supplies sold to owners, contractors 
and repairmen of real property, and it sets forth the 
requirements for the taxation of the sale or acquisition of 
tangible personal property which is to be used to improve, 
alter or repair real property. That rule provides in relevant 
part: 
A. Sale of tangible personal property 
to real property contractors and 
repairmen of real property is generally 
subject to tax. 
1. The person who converts the personal 
property into real property is the 
consumer of the personal property since 
he is the last one to own it as personal 
property. 
2. The contractor or repairman is the 
consumer of tangible personal property 
used to improve, alter or repair real 
property; regardless of the type of 
contract entered into—whether it is a 
lump sum, time and material, or a 
cost-plus contract. 
3. The sale of real property is not 
subject to the tax nor is the labor 
performed on real property. For 
example, the sale of a completed home or 
building is not subject to the tax, but 
sales of materials and supplies to 
contractors and subcontractors are 
taxable transactions as sales to final 
consumers. This is true whether the 
contract is performed for an individual, 
a religious institution, or a 
governmental instrumentality. 
4. Sales of materials to religious or 
charitable institutions and government 
agencies are exempt only if sold as 
tangible personal property and the 
seller does not install the material as 
an improvement to realty or use it to 
repair real property. 
10. Sales of materials from a vendor to a contractor 
or other person or entity for use in the construction, 
improvement, alteration or repair of real property for a 
governmental entity, religious institution or charitable 
organization is not exempt from sales and use tax. The 
incidents of the tax have been imposed on the contractor and 
not on the exempt entity. To be exempt, the sale must be from 
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the vendor directly to the governmental entity, religious 
institution or charitable organization for the use of, and 
consumption by, the exempt entity. 
11. The fact that the burden of the tax may be passed 
by the contractor on to the exempt entity in the form of higher 
prices and is thus paid indirectly by the exempt entity does 
not result in tax exemption for the transaction. (Rule 
R865-19-58S), Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax 
Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), and Ford J. 
Tvaits Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148 P.2d 
343 (1944), Qlsen Construction Company v. State Tax Commission, 
12 U.2d 42, 361 P.2d 1112 (1961). 
12. Parties seeking exemptions from the imposition of 
that tax bear the burden of proving that they qualify and are 
legally entitled to the exemption. Parson Asphalt Products v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (1980). 
13. In order for the sale to the exempt entity to be 
exempt from sales and use tax it must be a bona fide sale to 
the exempt entity acting either in the capacity as the final 
consumer of tangible personal property or the entity which 
converts the tangible personal property to real property. The 
sale is such a bona fide sale to an exempt entity only if 
either: 
a. The sale of materials or supplies is to the 
exempt entity and the exempt entity has its own 
employees attach the materials and/or supplies to 
the realty, or 
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b. The sale of materials and supplies is to the 
exempt entity, and the exempt entity separately 
hires a contractor to attach the materials and/or 
supplies to the realty on a labor only or install 
only contract, or 
c. The sale of materials and supplies is to an 
exempt entity which acts as the prime contractor 
by converting the tangible personal property to 
real property. 
14. The sale of tangible personal property is not 
exempt from sales and use tax if the exempt entity is simply 
acting as the purchasing agent for the general contractor. It 
is not merely whether the exempt entity engages in the 
mechanics of a purchase, but rarher the legal status of the 
exempt entity at the time the purchase is made, i.e., is it 
purchasing the property as the final consumer of the tangible 
personal property. If the exempt entity makes the purchase for 
itself and its own use, consumption, or conversion to real 
property, the purchase is exempt from sales and use tax. On 
the other hand, if the exempt entity makes the purchase for 
another person or entity, or for use, consumption, or 
conversion to real property by another person or entity, the 
purchase is not exempt from sales and use tax because the 
exempt entity has only acted in the capacity of a purchasing 
agent for the final consumer which is the contractor. 
-14-
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15. If the exempt entity enters into a furnish and 
install contract with a general or subcontractor which requires 
the general or subcontractor to furnish and install the 
materials and supplies, then the exempt entity is not acting as 
the prime contractor as to the materials and supplies required 
by contract to be provided by the general or subcontractor. 
16. When the general or subcontractor is required by 
contract to provide materials and supplies and install them on 
real property, then the contractor is the consumer of that 
tangible personal property and is liable for the sales and use 
tax, even if an exempt entity goes through the mechanics of a 
purchase by issuing a purchase order and a check for payment. 
The contract is the controlling document, and determines who is 
the final consumer of tangible personal property, and thus the 
contract determines upon which party the incidence of taxation 
falls. Actions taken in noncompliance with the contract may be 
accepted without objection by the contractor and the exempt 
entity, but unless the contract is modified or changed by 
change order to show the consent of the contractor and the 
exempt entity to the modifications, the actions that are not in 
compliance with the contract do not shift or change the 
incidents of taxation. The written terms of the agreement will 
govern the taxability of the transaction and not the actions of 
the parties. This is especially so because written documents 
can be audited by State Tax Commission auditors, but actions, 
based on only after the fact statements, allegations or 
representations are impossible to audit. 
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17. For the exempt organization to be acting as the 
prime contractor, the exempt organization, by and through its 
own employees or agents must: 
a. Exercise direct supervision over the 
construction project. 
b. Issue purchase orders to the vendors for all 
materials and supplies for which sales tax is not 
paid. 
c. Make direct payment to the vendors for all 
materials and supplies for which sales tax is not 
paid. 
d. Have provisions in any furnish and install 
contracts to permit changes through change orders 
to make that portion of the contract a labor only 
or install only contract, and those contractual 
provisions must be fully implemented and followed 
during the construction process. 
18. For the exempt organizations to act as the prime 
contractor exercising direct supervision over the construction 
project it is not necessary to act as the general contractor 
over the entire project. Instead, the exempt organization must 
exercise sufficient direct supervision over the purchased 
materials that there is a change in the legal status of which 
entity is responsible for those materials. Therefore, the 
exempt organization may be the prime contractor by exercising 
sufficient direct supervision over the purchased materials to 
be the prime contractor for a portion of the total contract. 
The prime contractor or direct supervision requirement may 
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apply to relationships within the full general contract. 
19. To be the prime contractor and exercise 
sufficient direct supervision, the exempt organization must 
assume the "burdens of risk" or the "incidents of risk." This 
requires evidence that the exempt organization has done more 
than just act as a "purchasing agent" for the general 
contractor. If a general contractor issues a purchase order on 
forms of the exempt entity and then later issues authorization 
for payment by check to the exempt entity, there has just been 
the creation of a "paper trail" and the direct supervision test 
has not been met. 
20. If the exempt organization and a general 
contractor enter into a furnish and install contract, the 
general contractor is contractually required to provide and 
install those materials. When the contractor provides and 
installs those materials the contractor is the final consumer 
of those materials and is required to pay sales or use tax on 
those materials (Rule R865-19-58S). For the exempt 
organization to purchase those materials and avoid sales or use 
tax, the furnish and install contract must contain a provision 
permitting change orders so the exempt organization may ' make 
such purchases, and the parties must then actually execute such 
change orders in advance of the purchases. The exempt 
organization, by its own employees or agents, must then issue 
purchase orders and vouchers or checks for payment, and must 
exercise direct supervision over the purchased materials. As 
evidence regarding whether or not the exempt organization 
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exercised direct supervision over the purchased materials, all 
of the relevant factors should be reviewed, including: 
a. Who assumed the burdens or incidents of risk? 
b. Who carried the risk of loss in the event of 
damage or destruction of the materials? 
c. Who, if anyone, carried and paid for 
insurance on the materials after delivery 
and prior to installation or attachment to 
the real property? 
d. Who physically inspected and counted the 
materials upon receipt? 
e. If there was a shortage in materials upon 
receipt, who was required to pay for 
additional materials? 
f. If there was an overage in materials upon 
receipt, who retained the surplus materials? 
g. If the materials did not meet specifications 
or quality standards, who had the right and 
authority to reject those materials? 
h. If materials were rejected for failure to 
meet quality standards or specifications, 
and it had resulted in a shutdown of the 
job, who would have been responsible for the 
shutdown expenses? 
i. Who was responsible for enforcing any 
warranties on the materials? 
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j. To whom did recourse go if the materials 
were faulty or defective? 
k. If materials failed after installation, who 
was responsible for any resulting damages 
including personal injuries? 
1. To whom did the title pass for the purchased 
materials? 
m. Were the bills submitted by the vendor 
directly to the exempt organization? 
n. Did the vendors look only to the exempt 
organization for payment of the bill? 
o. Did the general contractor or the 
subcontractor have to approve the bills 
before they were paid by the exempt 
organization? 
p. To whom were the materials delivered, i.e., 
to the contractor, the exempt organization 
or one of its employees or agents, or 
directly to the job site? 
21. Under a furnish and install contract, the 
contractor is required to furnish the materials and install 
those materials onto real property. Thus, the contractor is 
required to convert that tangible personal property into real 
property and the tax is imposed on that consumption of the 
tangible personal property by the contractor. Therefore, to 
avoid sales and use tax on materials used for a furnish and 
install contract, the contract must be modified through the 
execution and implementation of change orders. When those 
change orders have been executed and implemented, the modified 
contract must make it clear that the materials in question have 
been separately purchased and provided by the exempt 
organization and that the contractor's only duty with respect 
to those materials is to provide the labor to install those 
materials. 
22. For the purchases of materials and supplies to be 
exempt from sales and use tax, the exempt entity must make the 
purchase and, title to the purchased items must pass to the 
exempt entity prior to the time it is attached to real 
property. The exempt entity must deal with the purchased items 
as its own property and treat those items the same as it would 
treat items it purchases for its own use and consumption. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Sales and Use Tax is imposed not only upon the sale of 
tangible personal property, but also upon "tangible personal 
property stored, used or consumed in this state." (U.C.A. 
59-12-103[l]). In the construction business, when a person 
uses lumber, bricks, cement, steel, nails, and other materials 
to construct a building or other improvements to real estate, 
that person has used those materials and has converted the 
materials into real property. That conversion of tangible 
personal property into real property is deemed to be the 
consumption or use of the tangible personal property, which is 
the taxable event. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
sales and use tax is imposed upon the party that converts 
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tangible personal property into real property. Utah Concrete 
Products Corp. v. State Tax Commission, supra, Olson 
Construction Co. v. State Tax Commission, supra, and Tummurru 
Trades, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, supra. The party 
that makes that conversion from tangible personal property to 
real property has used or consumed that property, is the real 
property contractor, and is taxed on that property. If that 
conversion to real property is performed by anyone except an 
exempt entity, the use and consumption of the converted 
materials is subject to sales and use tax. If the conversion 
to real property is performed by an exempt entity acting as the 
real property contractor, the use and consumption of the 
converted materials is not subject to sales and use tax. 
Therefore, the primary issue in this case is to 
determine whether the Petitioner or the owner was the real 
property contractor. If a preponderance of the evidence 
indicates that Petitioner was the party that converted the 
tangible personal property into real property, then Petitioner 
was the real property contractor and is liable for the tax 
assessed by the Auditing Division. However, if a preponderance 
of the evidence indicates that the owner was the party that 
converted the tangible personal property into real property 
then the owner was the real property contractor and was exempt 
from the sales and use tax. 
To determine which party was the real property 
contractor, it is necessary to review and analyze the full 
scope of the contract and the legal rights, duties, 
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obligations, and relationships of the parties with respect to 
the materials converted into real property. The primary 
evidence available to the Commission to make that determination 
is the contract and agreement, together with all duly executed 
change orders and other written documents. Oral testimony is 
beneficial in interpreting the documents and gaining some 
insight into the conduct of the parties and, to some extent, 
their understanding of the requirements of the contract. 
However, where any inconsistencies may exist between the 
written contract, including executed change orders, and either 
the conduct or oral testimony of any person, the written 
contract must be presumed to govern or prevail. 
In this proceeding, a preponderance of the evidence 
shows that the legal rights, duties and obligations of the 
owner did not rise to the level of the real property contractor 
because the owner did not assume the burdens, risks, 
responsibilities and incidents of ownership of the materials 
being converted to real property. Except for the paper work 
involved in the purchase order and the check for payment, the 
owner had only minimal involvement in the project, during the 
construction process. The general contractor and the 
subcontractors had nearly total control of and responsibility 
for the materials during the construction process. The 
Petitioner provided lists, specifications and costs of 
materials to be purchased, and then received, inspected and 
approved the materials, signed the invoices, carried bonds and 
insurance on the materials, negotiated and administered the 
purchases of materials, and was fully responsible for the 
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materials and any problems with the materials. The Petitioner 
was also required to hold the owner harmless from any problems 
with the materials. The Petitioner, and not the owner, assumed 
nearly all of the burdens, risks and incidents of ownership of 
those materials. 
The owner did have a construction supervisor who made 
weekly visits to the project, but there is no evidence that he 
had any authority to be involved in the management of that 
project. It appears that his role was primarily to observe the 
construction progress and report back to his employer. There 
is no evidence that the construction supervisor had any 
responsibility to review or even look at the materials which 
the Petitioner alleges had been purchased by the school 
district, and there is no evidence that he was in any way 
involved with the materials that were converted to real 
property. 
The owner did carry insurance on those materials, but 
the contractor was also required to carry insurance on those 
materials. The contractor and subcontractors (including 
Petitioner) had all other burdens, risks, responsibilities, and 
incidents of ownership on those materials- The Petitioner was 
contractually required to provide the materials for its portion 
of the project. Petitioner installed those materials onto the 
project, and acted as the owner of those materials by assuming 
the risks, burdens, responsibilities and incidents of ownership 
during the construction process. A preponderance of the 
evidence indicates that Petitioner converted those materials 
from tangible personal property into real property. Therefore, 
Petitioner was the real property contractor for those materials 
and pursuant to Rule R865-19-58S was liable for the use tax on 
those materials. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the order of the Utah 
State Tax Commission that the Petition for Redetermination is 
hereby denied, and the audit assessment made by the Auditing 
Division is affirmed. It is so ordered. 
DATED this jfO^ day of , < ^ ^ A ' 1 9 ^ 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
an sen 
rman 
^JQ^ B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
S. Blaine Willes 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30)u days 
^Si^-fo, t o1^S.i f l^i^"«£ &•' ^ . " S E K ^ a . . 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Brown Plumbing and Heating Company (Brown) seeks a 
redetermination of the sales or use tax deficiency assessed 
against it by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. We reverse. 
FACTS 
In June 1985, the Board of Education of Alpine School 
District (Alpine) entered into a general contractor's agreement 
with Paulsen/Ellsworth Construction Company for the construction 
of Cedar Hollow Junior High School. Paragraph twenty of the 
contract's supplementary conditions provided that Alpine, "at its 
sole option and discretion, may purchase certain major items and 
quantities of materials from the specifications for utilization 
in the project by writing Purchase Orders directly to suppliers." 
It is undisputed that Alpine is a political subdivision, and as 
such, is exempt from sales tax payments.1 In the event of a 
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-6(1)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1985) 
direct purchase by Alpine, the purchase order amounts plus the 
sales tax that the contractor would have had to pay would be 
deducted from the contract price. The contract also provided 
that Alpine could amend the contract through a change order 
provision. 
In February 1986, the Paulsen/Ellsworth Company entered into 
a subcontract agreement with Brown to furnish and install the 
school's plumbing fixtures. The subcontract contained the same 
direct-purchase and change order provisions as the general 
contract. Brown knew before entering into the subcontract that 
Alpine intended to exercise its option to purchase certain 
materials directly from the suppliers. Alpine, in fact, did 
exercise its direct-purchase option. Alpine amended the 
subcontract through the change order provision deleting those 
direct-purchase materials from the subcontract. This, in effect, 
changed the subcontract from a furnish and install contract to an 
installation only contract with respect to the materials directly 
purchased by Alpine. Alpine's official disbursing agent issued 
the purchase orders for the materials, and title to materials 
vested directly in Alpine. 
As to the purchase of the plumbing materials, the parties 
stipulated to certain facts and the Tax Commission made specific 
findings of fact, which include the following: 
Petitioner was the plumbing subcontractor 
after entering into an agreement with 
Paulsen/Ellsworth Construction Company and 
was required to furnish and install plumbing 
fixtures on the project, subject to 
provisions for change orders. 
The General Conditions of the Contract for 
Construction also provided that the owner 
could amend the contract by change order and 
also subtract a contract sum from the total 
contract if it so desired. 
The agreement provided for direct purchases 
of construction materials by the school 
district by adherence to certain procedures 
as follows: 
a. The owner (Alpine School District) could 
purchase certain major items and 
quantities of materials for utilization 
in the project by writing purchase 
orders directly to the suppliers. 
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b. The general contractor and its 
subcontractors, were required to make a 
list of materials and the cost for which 
such materials could be directly 
purchased. 
c. The owner would then provide purchase 
requisitions upon which the contractor 
would specifically state its needs and 
schedules for delivery dates. 
d. The purchase orders were then written by 
the owner from the requisitions. 
e. The purchase order amount plus the sales 
tax amount was deducted from the total 
contract amount. 
f. Invoices received upon receipt of 
delivery of materials to the project 
site were sent to the owner for direct 
payment. 
If the owner decided to directly purchase 
materials through the above described 
procedure, invoices received upon delivery of 
materials to the project site were sent to 
the owner for direct payment to the vendor. 
Pursuant to contract documents, purchase 
orders were issued by the school district. 
The Supplementary Conditions of the 
Instructions to Bidders contained a statement 
that the title to all materials purchased 
directly by the owner on its own purchase 
orders, passed from the vendor directly to 
the Alpine Board of Education upon delivery 
to the job site without any vesting in the 
contractor. 
No surplus materials from the project were 
retained by the Petitioner. All materials 
purchased by the owner and installed by the 
Petitioner became fixtures or a part of the 
junior high school building. 
The owner provided insurance coverage for 
owner purchased materials after purchase and 
through construction for the building. 
The Auditing Division of the Tax Commission audited Brown 
for the period of January 1, 1984 to December 31, 1985. Brown 
was assessed with tax and interest for the materials directly 
purchased by Alpine. 
ISSUE 
The issue for us to decide is whether Brown can be held 
liable for sales tax on plumbing materials and supplies purchased 
by Alpine and installed by Brown. In its written determination, 
the Tax Commission characterized the primary issue in this case 
as "whether the Petitioner or the owner was the real property 
contractor." In light of the governing tax statute, the Tax 
Commission's characterization is not useful in determining 
whether Brown was liable for the sales tax on these commodities. 
ANALYSIS 
This action was commenced before the effective date of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) and we apply a pre-UAPA 
standard of review pursuant to Morton Int'l Inc. v Auditing Div., 
814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1992). Under Morton, we review for 
correctness an agency's application of findings of fact to 
statutes th€i agency is empowered to administer if the agency is 
in no better position to determine the issue. IdL at 585. 
The tax laws in effect during the tax assessment period 
govern this dispute. See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax 
Common, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah 1992). The Tax 
Commission specifically found the tax assessment period was 
January 1, 1984 to December 31, 1985. The governing Sales Tax 
Act is clear. "Tax" under the Act is "payable by the purchaser 
of a commodity or service subject to tax." Utah Code Ann. § 59-
15-2(8) (Supp. 1985). The tax assessment was on the sale of 
plumbing materials, that is, commodities purchased by Alpine. 
The Tax Commission makes two alternative arguments to 
support a determination that Brown, rather than Alpine, was the 
purchaser of these commodities. We find both of these arguments 
unpersuasive. The Commission first argues that Brown had the 
benefits and burdens of owning the property and is thus the 
purchaser. According to the case cited by the Tax Commission, 
the "benefits and burdens" test is used to determine when a 
transfer of property takes place for tax purposes. J.B.N. Tel. 
Co., Inc. v. United States, 638 F.2d 227, 232 (10th Cir. 1981). 
Sales tax, however, is imposed on the sale not the transfer of 
property. The Tax Commission next argues that Alpine was nothing 
more than the purchasing agent for Brown. The subcontract 
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specifically states that Alpine had sole discretion to determine 
what, if any, materials it would purchase. Because Brown had no 
control over Alpine's purchases, no agency relationship existed 
between Alpine and Brown as to those purchases. See Zions First 
Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 
(Utah 1988) . 
As the stipulated facts and Tax Commission findings 
indicate, the record can only support a finding that Alpine, not 
Brown was the purchaser of the commodities. Accordingly, the Tax 
Commission's application of the findings of fact to the Sales Tax 
Act and the resulting conclusion that Brown was liable for tax on 
the purchase of plumbing materials by Alpine was incorrect.2 
We reverse. 
Jackso 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
J 
A 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
2. Although the Tax Commission's brief focuses on sales tax 
liability, the Tax Commission makes inconsistent reference to 
both sales and use tax liability. We note that the governing Use 
Tax Act levies and imposes an excise tax on "[t]he storage, use, 
or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property 
purchased for storage, use, or other consumption in this state.11 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-16-3(a) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). 
Again, because use tax is based on the purchase of tangible 
personal property and Brown was not the purchaser, it cannot be 
liable for a use tax based on the purchase. 
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